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Abstract
Unilateral or sub-global actions on climate change are not very eﬀective but
global action is not achievable due to strong free-rider incentives. These in-
centives arise because non-signatories beneﬁt from emission reductions of sig-
natories without incurring abatement costs. Moreover, non-signatories may
even increase their emissions as a result of lower fuel prices and because of a
relocation of production from clean signatory to dirty non-signatory coun-
tries, typically referred to as carbon leakage. We study whether and under
which conditions border carbon adjustments (BCAs) can mitigate free-riding
in a simple strategic trade model which captures consumers' taste for vari-
ety. We show that BCAs lead to larger stable international climate agreements
associated with global welfare gains but only if treaties are of the open mem-
bership type and do not serve the interests of few countries which may prefer
an exclusive membership rule. We focus on the strategic interaction between
signatory and non-signatory countries and the game-theoretic properties and
institutional rules of treaty formation.
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1 Introduction
Unilateral or sub-global actions on climate change are not very eﬀective but global
action is not achievable due to strong free-rider incentives. These incentives arise
because non-signatories beneﬁt from emission reductions of signatories without in-
curring abatement costs. Moreover, non-signatories may even increase their emis-
sions due to higher fuel consumption as a result of lower fuel prices and because of
a relocation of production from clean signatory to dirty non-signatory countries,
typically referred to as carbon leakage. In order to mitigate these free-rider incen-
tives and to make climate agreements more eﬀective, trade measures, like border
carbon adjustments (BCAs), have become increasingly popular in the policy debate
(e.g. Financial Times, Feb. 12, 2017 and Zenghelis and Stern 2009) but also in
academic circles (e.g. Böhringer et al. 2017b, Fischer and Fox 2012 and Keen and
Kotsogiannis 2014). Border carbon adjustments1 is a complementary measure by a
group of countries, which we call signatory countries or members to a climate treaty,
which pursue a more ambitious climate policy than other countries, which we call
non-signatory countries or non-members, whereby a tariﬀ, which is de facto an emis-
sion tax, is imposed on imports. At least in theory, the tariﬀ is a tax per unit of
emissions, which is the same as the price of carbon (resulting from any form of en-
vironmental regulation) in signatory countries. Most authors talk about full BCAs
if tariﬀs are accompanied by output-based rebates (OBRs) whereby ﬁrms producing
under stricter environmental standards receive rebates for their exports. OBRs can
be paid directly or indirectly like the exemption of emission-intensive and trade ex-
posed industries from strict environmental regulation, like the steel and aluminum
industry within the EU-ETS, e.g. through a generous free allocation of tradeable
permits (Böhringer et al. 2017b). An OBR on its own is typically viewed as an
anti-leakage measure, but it violates the strong polluters pay principle and, at least
ceteris paribus, is less eﬀective in reducing emissions than tariﬀs. With OBRs, BCAs
are de facto a consumption-based environmental tax imposed in signatory markets.
The academic discussion about BCAs has broadly focused on three issues. The
ﬁrst issue is about the detailed design and practicability of trade measures for en-
vironmental reasons and to which extent they are compatible with WTO-rules (e.g.
Fischer 2015, Fischer and Fox 2012 and Mehling et al. 2017). It appears that the
overarching conclusions is that, despite many practical obstacles of implementation,
BCAs do not generally violate WTO-rules and are a good second-best instrument in
the absence of a global climate treaty.
The second issue is about the economic justiﬁcation of trade measures for environ-
mental reasons, which touches on the eﬃciency and costs of these measures.2 For
1We use the term BCAs to stress the environmental justiﬁcation of border tax adjustments
(BTAs), which are also discussed for other reasons, like diﬀerent labor standards and cooperate
taxes across countries.
2For an excellent discussion of this issue, see for instance Helm et al. (2012).
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instance, Stiglitz (2006) argues that the absence of carbon prices de facto constitute
a subsidy to dirty production and hence to ensure a level playing ﬁeld while inter-
nalizing the social cost of carbon, BCAs are just correcting a market imperfection.
Despite conventional trade theory argues against trade-barriers because diﬀerent
environmental standards simply reﬂect diﬀerent environmental preferences and/or
comparative advantages related to the relative abundance of the environment and
natural resources of countries, the correction of distortions through market interven-
tions can be justiﬁed in the context of global pollutants. The internalization through
ﬁrst- and second-best instruments has been analyzed for instance by Copeland and
Taylor (1995), Markusen (1975), Hoel (1996) and, more recently, e.g. by Keen and
Kotsogiannis (2014), Vlassis (2014) and Tsakiris (2014). It is clear that if BCAs do
not enforce uniformly higher environmental standards at the global scale but only
among a subgroup of countries, the welfare gains from a tougher environmental pol-
icy may be small if not negative as BCAs may seriously harm outsiders. In other
words, in an ideal word, BCAs are a threat to enforce full cooperation (or something
close to this), but, if successful, are not implemented.
The third issue relates to the eﬀectiveness of trade measures. The bulk of the litera-
ture conducts simulations with empirically calibrated computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models in order to estimate the ex-ante leakage eﬀect reduction of BCAs (full
or partial) as well as OBRs, at the aggregate and in particular sectors (Böhringer
et al. 2012, 2014, 2015, 2017a,b, Coron 2012 and Fischer and Fox 2012; see also
Branger and Quirion 2014 for a meta-analysis of 25 studies). Most of these studies
conﬁrm the conclusion that OBRs can reduce carbon-leakage but only import tariﬀs
lead also to a noticeable overall reduction of emissions as they curtail also consump-
tion. Due to the complexity of these multi-country multi-sector models, typically,
the environmental target/tax of signatory countries is set exogenously and the envi-
ronmental standards of non-signatories is ﬁxed at the level without BCAs. That is,
the strategic interaction between signatories and non-signatories in a game-theoretic
sense is not explicitly captured. Moreover, in contrast to the original idea of BCAs,
namely to support a climate treaty, the formation and stability of climate treaties is
not considered. An exception is Irfanouglu et al. (2015), but the analysis is restricted
to three countries. Although conceptually interesting, Helm et al. (2012) remain at
a rather stylized level in their analysis. Another exception is Weitzel et al. (2012)
who analyze stability of coalitions with the DART-model with 10 world regions and
9 diﬀerent sectors. However, their stability is seriously simpliﬁed as they consider
only stability of the grand coalition and a group of annex 1 countries.
A smaller part of the literature on the third issue is theoretical in nature and has
focused on the endogenous choice of policy levels among signatory countries, includ-
ing the reaction by non-signatory countries, in a strategic trade model of imperfect
competition. More surprisingly, also this literature has mainly ignored the issue of
treaty formation by restricting attention to two countries (e.g. Baksi and Chaudhuri
2017, Eyland and Zaccour 2013 and 2014). Typically, these models consider a home
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country, which recognizes or suﬀers more from environmental damages than a foreign
country, with lower or zero environmental damages. Hence, initially, subsidies are
lower or taxes higher in the home country in a non-cooperative equilibrium, typically
viewed as the status quo. Full cooperation fails in the absence of transfer payments
as the foreign countries welfare is lower under full cooperation than in the status quo
if the diﬀerence in the evaluation of environmental damages is pronounced enough.
It is then shown that BCAs may be able to lower the welfare of the foreign country
suﬃciently enough compared to the status quo such that the foreign country agrees
to full cooperation. That is, BCAs act as a threat to enforce cooperation. In these
simple models, an agreement is stable if it is individually rational compared to some
status quo, and the BCA changes this status quo. A slight variation of this stability
concept is considered in Anoulies (2014) who shows that the minimum discount fac-
tor necessary to enforce a fully cooperative solution in a repeated game is reduced
if this triggers the implementation of the BCA-regime as punishment instead of the
non-cooperative fall back position. Probably more interesting is the ﬁnding that
for most parameter values the home country prefers the BCA-regime over the fully
cooperative solution, suggesting that BCAs are a credible threat. As far as we are
aware, only Baksi and Chaudhuri (2014) consider BCAs in n-country model of coali-
tion formation, but they only analyze the stability of the grand coalition and ignore
the entire process of treaty formation.
Our paper is in the tradition of the game-theoretic literature on the third issue. In
contrast to previous papers, we model the entire process of treaty formation including
stability, though admittedly, the model abstracts from many details captured by CGE
models. We are interested in two main issues.
Firstly, how BCAs change the properties of an n-country public good provision game
with the possibility of forming self-enforcing treaties as known from the literature
on international environmental agreements.3 We distinguish between positive and
normative properties. Positive properties help to explain why without BCAs climate
agreements are not very eﬀective and the normative properties evaluate outcomes
in relation to the benchmarks of a non-cooperative and fully cooperative outcome.
Both type of properties give rise to what Barrett (1994a) called the paradox of coop-
eration: stable agreements are either small, shallow or both whenever the gains from
cooperation would be large; they may enjoy large participation but only if gains from
cooperation are small.4 We show that BCAs change some of the standard properties
fundamentally. On the one hand, countries ﬁnd it less attractive to stay outside
an agreement as they may now be negatively aﬀected by other countries joining a
climate agreement. Moreover, countries ﬁnd it more attractive to join an agreement
as the gains from cooperation are increased. On the other hand, a sequential en-
largement of an agreement may no longer be associated with an increase of global
3See Finus and Caparrós (2015) for a recent survey of this literature and a collection of the most
inﬂuential articles since the early papers by Barrett (1994a) and Carraro and Siniscalco (1993).
4Intuitively, when the gains from cooperation are large, cooperation requires a major departure
from non-cooperative behavior, associated with large free-rider incentives and vice versa.
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welfare - BCAs may impose serious welfare costs as long as not full cooperation is
achieved.
Secondly, we are interested how diﬀerent membership rules aﬀect the success of
BCAs. We show that signatories may ﬁnd it attractive to restrict accession to their
agreement before full participation is reached due to strategic reasons. Consequently,
under an exclusive membership rule, a fully cooperative agreement may not be ob-
tained, which may go along with large welfare costs at the world scale. We analyze
this issue by considering a simultaneous and sequential process of coalition formation.
This paper is an extension of Finus and Al Khourdajie (2017), which considers tax-
ation in an intra-industry trade model with horizontal product diﬀerentiation and
consumers' taste for variety (TFV) and coalition formation, by adding import tariﬀs.
We do not consider OBRs for two reasons. Firstly because we can show that BCAs
even without OBRs can lead to successful climate agreements, in particular if they
are in the tradition of environmental treaties of the open membership type. Sec-
ondly, OBRs would undermine the strong polluter principle. Domestic production
is harmful irrespective of the market to which goods are sold and even with OBRs,
the harmful production of non-signatories for their own market are not internalized.
Hence, a justiﬁcation within WTO-rules seems much weaker. We brieﬂy discuss our
and alternative assumptions in the concluding Section 6.
Our model beneﬁts from three strands of literature. Firstly, the literature on strategic
trade models, which extended the model by Brander and Spencer (1985) by includ-
ing environmental damages and consumer surplus in governments welfare function
(e.g. Barrett 1994b, Conrad 1993, Kennedy 1994 and Ulph 1996), though this liter-
ature has mainly restricted attention to only two countries and/or ignored the issue
of agreement formation. Secondly, the literature on international environmental
agreements, which focuses on treaty formation and emission reduction, but typically
ignores trade.5 Thirdly, the literature on trade agreements, though without consid-
ering environmental issues, in a very similar setting than ours and from which it
emerges that membership rules may determine the success of treaty formation (e.g.
Yi 1996 and 2000).
Our paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present the three-stage coalition
formation model in which countries choose ﬁrst their membership, then choose their
policy levels and ﬁnally ﬁrms choose their output. We solve the game by backwards
induction and hence consider the output stage in section 3, the policy stage in section
4 and the membership stage in section 5, including an overall evaluation of stable
agreements. Section 6 concludes, qualiﬁes our results and points to future research.
5See the literature cited in Finus and Caparrós (2015). Eichner and Pethig (2013, 2014, 2015)
have recently introduced trade in the IEA-literature, though their model is very diﬀerent from our
intra-industry trade model and they do not consider BCAs.
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2 Model
2.1 Coalition Formation Game
Consider an intra-industry trade model with n ex-ante symmetric countries with a
representative ﬁrm and consumer in each country. We denote the set of countries by
N with n the number of countries, the cardinality of N . Firms produce a horizontally
diﬀerentiated good, i.e. the same good but in diﬀerent varieties where each ﬁrm
produces one variety. This good causes environmental damages; the production uses
emissions as an input, for example in the form of energy by which greenhouse gases
are released. Firms compete in a Nash-Cournot fashion. Markets are segmented
and each ﬁrm supplies its good to the domestic and all foreign markets. Because of
the segmentation of markets, ﬁrms play a separate Cournot-game in each market.
Transport costs are assumed away as usual.6
We assume a three-stage coalition formation game:
Stage 1, Choice of Membership: all countries decide simultaneously whether to join
coalition S⊆ N with m the cardinality of S, 1 ≤ m≤ n. Countries which do not join
S act as singletons. A typical signatory will be denoted by i and a non-signatory by
j.
Stage 2, Choice of Policy Level: all countries choose simultaneously their emission
tax.
• Signatories choose their tax ti (implemented uniformly in all signatory coun-
tries) by maximizing the joint welfare of coalition S: max
ti
∑
i∈SWi.
• Non-signatories choose their individual tax tj by maximizing their individual
welfare: max
tj
Wj.
Stage 3, Choice of Output: all ﬁrms choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively
their segmented market outputs by maximizing their producer surplus: max
q1i,...,qni
PSi.
The game is solved by backwards induction.
In the third stage, ﬁrms play a Nash equilibrium output game in each segmented
market, facing taxes. Output qki refers to the output of ﬁrm i sold in market k.
We consider two tax regimes. The ﬁrst regime is called No-BCA-regime. Each
government imposes a tax on its representative ﬁrm. Firms in signatory countries
face tax ti and ﬁrms in non-signatory countries face tax tj. As will become clear
below, the emissions tax is equivalent to an output tax as the tax is imposed per
unit of output and we assume a constant emission output ratio which we normalize
6Thus, our model is in the spirit of for instance Loke and Winter (2012) and Yi (1996, 2000).
See also Helpman and Krugman (1985).
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to one. The second regime is called the BCA-regime. It is almost identical to the
ﬁrst regime, except for ﬁrms in non-signatory countries. For quantities sold to their
own market or any other non-signatory market, they again face tax tj. Also for
quantities sold to signatory markets, they need to pay tax tj as usual if tj ≥ ti.
However, if tj < ti, they need to pay additionally a mark-up φ(ti − tj), i.e. the
border carbon adjustment and hence they pay tj + φ(ti − tj) per unit of output.
Following Eyland and Zaccour (2013), we call φ the BCA-adjustment parameter. In
accordance with the anti-discrimination rules of the WTO, φ > 1 is not feasible and
hence we need to assume 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. Obviously, for φ = 0, BCA- and No-BCA-
regime coincide. If signatories can use border carbon adjustments in stage 2, it seems
sensible to assume φ = 1, not only as a benchmark case, but also because signatories
would have no reason to choose any smaller value could they choose this parameter
optimally.7 This equips signatories with the maximum possible enforcement power.
The third stage delivers an equilibrium vector of outputs of ﬁrms located in signatory
and non-signatory countries which is a function of all taxes.
In the second stage, inserting equilibrium outputs from stage 3 in countries' welfare
function, we can solve for countries equilibrium tax rates. Signatories choose their
taxes by acting as one single player whereas each non-signatory acts as a single player.
Hence, the solution of the second stage can be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium
tax game between coalition S with m players and n − m singleton players. As
we will see, equilibrium taxes depend on the size of coalitions and whether border
carbon adjustments are available to signatories. If we insert equilibrium tax rates
(stage 2) into equilibrium outputs (stage 3) and those in welfare functions, welfare
of signatories and non-signatories can be expressed as a function of coalition S only,
Wi(S) and Wj(S), respectively. This provides the input for the ﬁrst stage.
In the ﬁrst stage, we solve for a Nash equilibrium in membership strategies in a
cartel formation game (d'Aspremont et al. 1983), also called a simultaneous move
open-membership single coalition game (Yi 1997) in order to stress the institutional
setting of this type of agreement. Each country simultaneously chooses whether to
join coalition S or to remain a singleton. The treaty is of the open-membership type
because nobody can be excluded from joining coalition S. A coalition is called stable
if no player has an incentive to change her announcement, given the announcement
of all other players. Following d'Aspremont et al. (1983), we can also say that no
signatory has an incentive to leave coalition S (internally stability: Wi(S)−Wi(S \
{i}) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ S) and no non-signatory has an incentive to join coalition S (external
stability: Wj(S)−Wj(S∪{j}) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N \S ). In the course of the later discussion,
we will also consider and introduce alternative institutional settings, e.g. a sequential
choice of membership and exclusive membership.
We note that if the grand coalition forms (a coalition of all players), this replicates
the social optimum, and if no coalition forms, i.e. all players act as singletons, this
7It can be shown that signatory countries would choose φ > 1 if φ was treated as a choice
variable.
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replicates a Nash equilibrium in a game without coalition formation. Moreover, if
the grand coalition forms, and hence there is no outsider left in the game, the taxes
under the BCA- and No-BCA-regime coincide, which are socially optimal. Also if
all players act as singletons, so no agreement has formed, no tariﬀ at the border can
be implemented, and, again, taxes under both regimes coincide.
2.2 Welfare Function
In this subsection, we have a closer look at the welfare function of governments and
its diﬀerent components.
If a country i becomes a signatory, i ∈ S , its welfare is given by:
Wi = CSi + PSi −Di + TRi +BCRi (1)
where CSi represents country i
′s consumer surplus, PSi country i′s producer surplus,
Di is the pollution damage faced by country i, TRi is country i
′s tax revenue from
the tax imposed by the government on its domestic ﬁrm's production, and BCRi
is country i′s tariﬀ from the border carbon adjustment imposed by the domestic
government on imports from ﬁrms located in non-signatory countries. Of course,
under the No-BCA-regime BCRi = 0.
If a country j remains a non-signatory, j ∈ N\S, its welfare is given by:
Wj = CSj + PSj −Dj + TRj (2)
with the same welfare components as in equation (1) after the appropriate changes
of subscripts. Note that the BCR-term is missing in a non-signatory government's
welfare function as per assumption they cannot impose a tariﬀ on imports.
Consumers in all countries have identical preferences which are represented by a
quasi-linear utility function over two goods:
ui(qi;Mi) = vi(qi) +Mi = aQi. − γ
2
Q2i. −
1− γ
2
∑
k∈N
q2ik +Mi (3)
where vi represents the utility from consuming the horizontally diﬀerentiated and
traded good and Mi represents the utility from consuming the numeraire good, rep-
resenting the composition of all other goods; qi = (qi1, ..., qin) is a vector of the
varieties consumed by consumers in country i that are produced by all signatories'
and non-signatories' ﬁrms, with qik representing country i
′s consumption of country
k′s variety8; a is a positive demand parameter and Qi. =
∑
k∈N qik is country i
′s total
8Throughout the paper the ﬁrst subscript indicates the market in which the variety is consumed
and the second subscript indicates the country in which it is produced.
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consumption of all varieties, supplied by all ﬁrms k (i.e. located in signatory and
non-signatory countries). Thus, utility is linear in the numeraire good and quadratic
in the diﬀerentiated good. Consumers have a taste for variety (Dixit and Stiglitz,
1977). Hence, their utility depends not only on the total quantity consumed (term
aQi.− γ2Q2i. in (3)) but also on the composition of quantities of the diﬀerentiated good
(term −1−γ
2
∑
k∈N q
2
ik in (3)) as for instance assumed in Yi (1996 and 2000). The
taste for variety (abbreviated TFV hereafter) is captured by parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] .
High values of γ imply a low taste for variety and low values of γ correspond to
a high taste for variety. For γ = 1 varieties are perfect substitutes and for γ = 0
varieties cannot be substituted at all.9
From (3), consumer i's inverse demand function for country k′s variety follows from:
pik =
∂ui
∂qik
⇐⇒ pik = a− (1− γ)qik − γQi. ⇐⇒ pik = a− qik − γ
∑
l∈N,l 6=k
qil (4)
where pik represents the price faced by consumers in country i consuming the variety
produced by a ﬁrm located in country k and
∑
l∈N,l 6=k qil is the sum of all consumed
varieties produced by all ﬁrms except the ﬁrm located in country k.
From (3) and (4), the consumer surplus in country i is given by:
CSi = aQi. − γ
2
Q2i. −
1− γ
2
∑
k∈N
q2ik −
∑
k∈N
qikpik (5)
where the last term in (5) is the representative consumer i's spending.
For producers, allowing for the possibility of border carbon adjustments, we need
to distinguish between ﬁrms located in signatory and non-signatory countries. The
producer surplus of a ﬁrm located in a signatory country i is the sum of its proﬁt
obtained in each market:
PSi =
∑
k∈S
piki +
∑
l∈N\S
pili =
∑
k∈S
qki(pki − c− ti) +
∑
l∈N\S
qli(pli − c− ti) (6)
where piki (pili) represents ﬁrm i's proﬁt in signatory k's (non-signatory l
′s) market
from selling quantity qki (qli) at price pki (pli); c is a constant marginal cost parameter
and ti is the tax imposed by country i's government on its ﬁrm's production.
Also the producer surplus of a ﬁrm located in a non-signatory country j is the sum
of its proﬁt in each market:
PSj =
∑
k∈S
pikj +
∑
l∈N\S
pilj =
∑
k∈S
qkj(pkj − c− tj − Ω) +
∑
l∈N\S
qlj(plj − c− tj) (7)
9An extension could be the ideal variety approach where consumers have not only a general
preference for the variety of a good but also a preference for a particular variety. One application
is a preference for the domestically produced variety (Di Comite et al. 2014).
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with Ω =
{
φ(ti − tj) if ti > tj
0 if ti ≤ tj
where pikj (pilj) represents ﬁrm j's proﬁt in signatory k's (non-signatory l
′s) market
from selling quantity qkj (qlj) at price pkj (plj), and tj is the tax imposed by country
j′s government on its ﬁrm's production. Clearly, under the No-BCA-regime, φ = 0,
therefore Ω = 0 and hence the structure of the producer surplus of a ﬁrm located in a
signatory and non-signatory country is the same. Under the BCA-regime, this is also
the case if ti ≤ tj because then Ω = 0, but is diﬀerent if ti > tj because then Ω > 0
provided there is some adjustment, i.e. φ> 0. As mentioned above, we assume full
adjustment under the BCA-regime and hence set φ= 1 later on. Then tj + Ω = ti,
i.e. ﬁrms located in non-signatory countries face de facto signatories' tax ti for all
quantities which they export to signatories' markets. For all other quantities they
face only their local tax tj.
Damages in signatory and non-signatory countries are the same (Di = Dj = Dl )
and are given by:
Dl = δQ (8)
where δ is a damage parameter, Q =
∑
i∈N Q.i =
∑
i∈N Qi. is total production
which is equal to total consumption world-wide. That is, we assume a constant
emission output coeﬃcient which we normalize to 1. Hence, we assume that emissions
constitute a pure public bad: damages depend on total emissions. As there is no
abatement technology in our simple model, emission and output tax are the same
and an output/emission tax is an eﬃcient policy instrument to address externalities.
The tax revenue of signatory country i is given by:
TRi = ti
∑
k∈N
qki (9)
which is the tax rate it imposes on its ﬁrm multiplied by the total quantity produced
by its ﬁrm for all markets. Similarly, the tax revenue of non-signatory country j is
given by:
TRj = tj
∑
k∈N
qkj . (10)
Finally, under the BCA-regime, the border carbon adjustment revenue of a signatory
country obtained from the adjustment Ω on imports from ﬁrms located in non-
signatory countries is given by:
BCRi = Ω
∑
j∈N\S
qij (11)
with Ω deﬁned in equation (7).
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3 Third Stage
In this section, we derive output of ﬁrms in the third stage. The background of this
derivation is provided in Appendix 1 which draws on the description of the coalition
formation game in subsection 2.1 and the description of the welfare components
in subsection 2.2. Subsection 2.1 is relevant in that m signatories jointly choose
a uniform tax ti and n − m non-signatories choose individually their tax tj. In
the following, for simplicity, we already use the information from stage 2 that, in
equilibrium, not only all signatories will choose the same ti but also all non-signatories
choose the same tax tj (because of identical welfare functions), though normally
ti 6= tj. From subsection 2.2 we use the demand function in each market and the
deﬁnition of the producer surplus, which ﬁrms maximize by choosing their output
vector, i.e. the quantities of their variety they sell to diﬀerent markets. This output
vector has the structure displayed in the table below.
Sign. ﬁrm i Non-sign. ﬁrm j Total Consumption
Sign. market k q∗ki q
∗
kj Q
∗
k.
Non-sign. market l q∗li q
∗
lj Q
∗
l.
Total Production Q∗.i Q
∗
.j Q
In the following, we start by listing the quantities consumed in diﬀerent markets and
then display aggregate production levels. In order to cover both regimes, the No-
BCA- and the BCA-regime, we display quantities with the adjustment parameter φ
where appropriate, noting that by setting φ = 0 (φ = 1) quantities in the No-BCA-
(BCA-) regime would be obtained. It is important to note that quantities are a
function of equilibrium taxes, which are determined in stage 2 and those taxes will
diﬀer between the No-BCA- and the BCA-regime. Hence for instance, equilibrium
quantity q∗li in (12) below will diﬀer in both regimes because equilibrium taxes diﬀer.
By the same token, this applies to all quantities listed below.
A signatory ﬁrm i's variety produced for a non-signatory l's market is given by
q∗li =
(a− c)(2− γ)− [γ(n−m) + (2− γ)] ti + [γ(n−m)] tj
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ) (12)
and a non-signatory ﬁrm j's variety produced for a non-signatory l's market is
q∗lj =
(a− c)(2− γ) + γmti − [2 + γ(m− 1))] tj
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ) (13)
with the total equilibrium consumption in a non-signatory l's market from all vari-
eties given by:
Q∗l. =
n(a− c)−mti − (n−m)tj
(n− 1)γ + 2 . (14)
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Hence, in non-signatory markets, the adjustment parameter φ does not play a role.
This is diﬀerent in signatories' markets.
A signatory ﬁrm i's variety produced for a signatory k's market is given by:
q∗ki =
(a− c)(2− γ)− [γ(n−m)(1− φ) + (2− γ)] ti + [γ(n−m)(1− φ)] tj
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ) (15)
and a non-signatory ﬁrm j's variety produced for a signatory k's market is given by:
q∗kj =
(a− c)(2− γ) + [γm− φ(2 + γ(m− 1))] ti − [2 + γ(m− 1)− φ(2 + γ(m− 1))] tj
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ)
(16)
with the total equilibrium consumption in a signatory k's market from all varieties
given by:
Q∗k. =
n(a− c)− [n− (n−m)(1− φ)] ti − [(n−m)(1− φ)] tj
(n− 1)γ + 2 . (17)
We now look at total production. Total production of a signatory's ﬁrm i's variety
to all markets is given by:
Q∗.i =
n(a− c)(2− γ)− [2n+ γn(n− 1−m)− φγm(n−m)] ti
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ)
+
[n(n−m)− φm(n−m)] tj
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ) (18)
and total production of a non-signatory's ﬁrm j's variety to all markets is given by:
Q∗.j =
n(a− c)(2− γ) + [γnm− φm(2 + γ(m− 1))] t∗i
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ)
− [γnm+ n(2− γ)− φm(2 + γ(m− 1))] t
∗
j
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ) (19)
and ﬁnally, total production/consumption by all countries is given by:
Q =
n2(a− c)− [nm+ φm(n−m)] t∗i − [n(n−m)− φm(n−m)] t∗j
(n− 1)γ + 2 . (20)
In order to render the comparison between the two regimes interesting, henceforth,
when refering to the BCA-regime, we assume ti > tj , i.e. signatories choose a higher
tax (or lower subsidy) than non-signatories. Using the quantities listed in (12) to
(20), some basic algebra allows to draw the following conclusions.
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Proposition 1 - The Eﬀect of Taxes on Equilibrium Quantities
Suppose a coalition S with m signatories has formed in the ﬁrst stage, and let 1 <
m < n.
• Under the No-BCA-regime, the quantity of ﬁrm i's (j's) variety supplied in
any market h ∈ N decreases in signatories' (non-signatories') taxes, ∂q∗hi
∂ti
< 0
(
∂q∗hj
∂tj
< 0), and increases in non-signatories' (signatories') taxes,
∂q∗hi
∂tj
> 0
(
∂q∗hj
∂ti
> 0), except for γ = 0 in which case
∂q∗hi
∂tj
= 0 (
∂q∗hj
∂ti
= 0). Under the
BCA-regime, the same is true for all quantities supplied to non-signatories'
markets l ∈ N \ S, i.e. ∂q∗li
∂ti
< 0 (
∂q∗lj
∂tj
< 0) and
∂q∗li
∂tj
> 0 (
∂q∗lj
∂ti
> 0 ), except
for γ = 0 in which case
∂q∗li
∂tj
= 0 (
∂q∗lj
∂ti
= 0). For quantities supplied to all
signatories' markets k ∈ S, the quantities of ﬁrms i's and j's varieties decrease
in signatories' taxes,
∂q∗ki
∂ti
< 0 and
∂q∗kj
∂ti
< 0 , whereas they remain unaﬀected by
non-signatories' taxes,
∂q∗kj
∂tj
= 0 and ∂qki
∂tj
= 0 .
• Under the No-BCA-regime, the total quantity produced by ﬁrm i (j) decreases
(increases) in signatories' taxes and increases (decreases) in non-signatories'
taxes ,
∂Q∗.i
∂ti
< 0 and
∂Q∗.i
∂tj
> 0 (
∂Q∗.j
∂ti
> 0 and
∂Q∗.j
∂tj
< 0), except for γ = 0 in
which case
∂Q∗.i
∂tj
= 0 (
∂Q∗.j
∂ti
= 0). Under the BCA-regime, the same is true for
all ﬁrms i located in signatory countries, i.e.
∂Q∗.i
∂ti
< 0 and
∂Q∗.i
∂tj
> 0, except for
γ = 0 in which case
∂Q∗.i
∂tj
= 0. For ﬁrms j located in non-signatory countries
∂Q∗.j
∂tj
< 0 but
∂Q∗.j
∂ti
> 0 if and only if γ(n−m+ 1)− 2 > 0 (otherwise ∂Q∗.j
∂ti
≤ 0).
• Under the No-BCA-regime, the total quantity consumed in any market h ∈ N
decreases in both taxes,
∂Q∗h.
∂ti
< 0 and
∂Q∗h.
∂tj
< 0. Under the BCA-regime, the
same is true for all quantities supplied to all non-signatories' markets l ∈
N \ S , i.e.∂Q∗l.
∂ti
< 0 and
∂Q∗l.
∂tj
< 0 . For quantities supplied to all signatories'
markets k ∈ S, the total quantity consumed in a signatory's market decreases
in signatories' taxes but are unaﬀected by non-signatories' taxes:
∂Q∗k.
∂ti
< 0 and
∂Q∗k.
∂tj
= 0.
Proof: Follows directly from equations (12) to (20) above, assuming φ = 0 under
the No-BCA- and φ = 1 and ti > tj under the BCA-regime. Q.E.D.
Under the No-BCA-regime, as expected, quantities of any ﬁrm's variety (signatory's
or non-signatory's ﬁrm) produced for any market (signatories' and non-signatories'
markets) are negatively aﬀected by domestic taxes and positively aﬀected by foreign
taxes. Only for full TFV, i.e. γ = 0, will a ﬁrm's output not be (positively) aﬀected
by foreign taxes (imposed on foreign ﬁrms). In this particular case, each ﬁrm acts
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like a monopolist in each market as consumers do not substitute between varieties
and hence there is no competition among ﬁrms. Under the BCA-regime, the same
strategic interaction applies in non-signatories' markets. However, in signatories
markets, all ﬁrms face de facto the same tax ti under BCAs and therefore non-
signatories' taxes tj do not aﬀect quantities supplied in these markets.
This strategic interaction between domestic and foreign taxes is also reﬂected at the
level of total production. Total quantities produced by a ﬁrm are negatively aﬀected
by domestic taxes and positively by foreign taxes; only for full TFV, production levels
are not aﬀected by foreign taxes. Under the BCA-regime, there is one exception
from this general pattern. The total production of a ﬁrm located in a non-signatory
country may be negatively aﬀected by signatories' taxes as there are two eﬀects.
Quantities sold to non-signatories markets are positively aﬀected by signatories' taxes
(as usual; see (13)), but quantities sold to signatories' markets are negatively aﬀected
(see 16). Overall, if the value of γ is small and/or the coalition is large (large value
of m), the negative eﬀect dominates the positive eﬀect.
Finally, total consumption in every country decreases in signatories' and non-signatories'
taxes. Only under the BCA-regime, the consumption in a signatory country is not
aﬀected by non-signatories' taxes.
Taken together, under the BCA-regime, governments in signatory countries jointly
enjoy more market power by protecting their domestic markets through border car-
bon adjustments than under the No-BCA-regime. That is, if signatory governments
choose a higher tax than non-signatory governments under the BCA-regime, at least
in signatories' markets all ﬁrms face de facto the same tax ti and hence act on an
equal playing ﬁeld. The following proposition sheds further light on the diﬀerence
of production and consumption patterns under the two regimes. In order to focus
the analysis, henceforth, we assume ti > tj not only under the BCA- but also under
No-BCA-regime. In section 4, we will discuss this assumption in more detail where
we derive equilibrium taxes in the second stage of the game.
Proposition 2 - The Eﬀects of Taxes on Production and Consumption
Patterns
Suppose a coalition S with m signatories has formed in the ﬁrst stage, and let 1 <
m < n. Moreover, assume that governments have chosen their taxes in the second
stage and let ti > tj under the No-BCA- and BCA-regime.
• Under the No-BCA-regime, signatory ﬁrm i′s outputs (non-signatory ﬁrm j′s
outputs) for all markets are the same, q∗ki = q
∗
li ( q
∗
lj = q
∗
kj). Under the BCA-
regime, outputs are diﬀerentiated. Signatory ﬁrm i′s outputs for signatories'
markets k ∈ S are higher than their outputs for non-signatories' markets l ∈
S \N , q∗ki > q∗li, except for γ = 0 in which case q∗ki = q∗li. Non-signatory ﬁrm
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j′s outputs for non-signatories' markets l ∈ S \N are higher than their outputs
for signatories' markets k ∈ S, q∗lj > q∗kj.
• In every signatory market k ∈ S, under the No-BCA-regime, signatory i's
output is lower than non-signatory ﬁrm j′s output, q∗ki ≤ q∗kj whereas under
the BCA-regime, signatory i's output and non-signatory ﬁrm j′s output are the
same, q∗ki = q
∗
kj.
• Under both regimes, in every non-signatory market l ∈ S \N , a non-signatory
ﬁrm j′s output is always higher than a signatory ﬁrm i′s output, q∗li < q
∗
lj.
• Consequently, total production of a signatory ﬁrm i is lower than of a non-
signatory ﬁrm j under both regimes, Q∗.i < Q
∗
.j. Moreover, total consumption
in all markets is the same under the No-BCA-regime, Q∗k. = Q
∗
l., but is lower
in every signatory market k ∈ S than in every non-signatory market l ∈ S \N
under the BCA-regime, Q∗k. < Q
∗
l..
Proof: Follows directly from equations (12) to (20) above, assuming ti > tj , φ = 0
under the No-BCA- and φ = 1 under the BCA-regime. Q.E.D.
Whereas under the No-BCA-regime, ﬁrms supply the same quantities to all markets,
they diﬀerentiate quantities under the BCA-regime. Under the No-BCA-regime only
taxes but not markets matter for ﬁrms' proﬁts. In contrast, under the BCA-regime,
markets matter because taxes are diﬀerent in diﬀerent markets. For ﬁrms located
in signatory countries, signatories' markets are more attractive because also their
competitors face tax ti whereas in non-signatories' markets they also face ti but
their competitors only tj. For ﬁrms located in non-signatory countries, the mirror
image argument applies and hence they prefer to sell more to non-signatories' than
signatories' markets.
Generally speaking, quantities sold in each market depend on relative taxes. Because
taxes in signatory countries are higher than in non-signatory countries by assumption,
ﬁrms located in non-signatory countries sell more in each market and hence have
higher proﬁts than ﬁrms located in signatory countries. This advantage of non-
signatory over signatory ﬁrms is partially oﬀset through BCAs because quantities and
hence proﬁts in signatory markets are now the same (though quantities and proﬁts in
non-signatory markets are still higher). Not surprisingly, at the aggregate production
level, under both regimes, non-signatory ﬁrms produce more than signatory ﬁrms and
hence earn higher proﬁts. Thus, taken together, BCAs allow to reduce diﬀerences in
proﬁts between signatory and non-signatory ﬁrms but cannot make this diﬀerence
disappear.
It is important to note that this conclusion does not change when moving from ﬁrms'
perspective to an aggregate welfare perspective. Signatory ﬁrms' proﬁts are lower
than non-signatory ﬁrms' proﬁts for two reasons. Lower output and higher taxes.
However from a countries welfare perspective taxes are welfare neutral in this simple
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model: ﬁrms' tax bills are revenues of governments. Thus, what matters at the
aggregate are proﬁts excluding tax payments, i.e. gross proﬁts. Hence, also from
this aggregate welfare perspective, signatory countries are disadvantaged because of
lower gross proﬁts, which is a result of lower output.10
Regarding consumption, under the No-BCA-regime, consumers in signatory and non-
signatory countries consume exactly the same individual and hence total quantities.
Hence, the consumer surplus in signatory and non-signatory countries is the same. In
contrast, under the BCA-regime, total consumption in signatories' markets is lower
than in non-signatories' markets as all quantities supplied to signatory markets face
the high tax ti whereas those supplied to non-signatories' markets depend not only on
ti but also on lower tj. This also implies that the quantity for each variety consumed
is lower in a signatory market than in a non-signatory market, and, consequently, also
the consumer surplus is lower in signatory than in non-signatory countries. Thus,
it is important to note that the border carbon adjustment does not improve but
worsens the situation compared to the No-BCA-regime.
In terms of environmental damages, even though total production and hence global
pollution may be reduced when moving from the No-BCA- to the BCA-regime, in
relative terms nothing changes between signatory and non-signatory countries, as
damages are the same in both types of countries.
Finally, there is an additional factor that comes into play when moving from the No-
BCA- to the BCA-regime, the revenues from the border carbon adjustment. This is
de facto a transfer from non-signatory to signatory countries, respectively from the
ﬁrms located in non-signatory countries to signatory governments.
Hence, overall, implementing a BCA-regime implies reducing the competitive ad-
vantage of non-signatory over signatory ﬁrms and hence reducing the diﬀerence in
gross proﬁts, collecting revenues from foreign ﬁrms by signatory governments, but
disadvantaging consumers in signatory countries. As our later analysis will illustrate,
the overall eﬀect works to the advantage of signatory over non-signatory countries,
explaining, among other factors, why larger agreements are stable under the BCA-
compared to the No-BCA-regime, though it will turn out that we need to be careful
in rushing to conclusions regarding global welfare.
4 Second Stage
In the second stage, governments choose their taxes. All governments understand
how taxes aﬀect quantities and how they aﬀect welfare. That is, governments have
solved the third stage of the game. As pointed out in subsection 2.1, the diﬀerence
is that governments which are part of coalition S, choose their tax ti by maximizing
the aggregate welfare of all coalition members, and governments which do not belong
10A proof is straightforward and available upon request.
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to S choose their tax tj by maximizing their individual welfare. Taxes of other
governments are taken as given.11 The simultaneous solution of the m ﬁrst order
conditions of signatory governments and n−m ﬁrst order conditions of non-signatory
governments delivers equilibrium taxes, which are a function of all parameters of the
model, but in particular they depend on the size of coalition S, m, and hence we
may write t∗i (m) and t
∗
j(m). It turns out that welfare functions are strictly convex in
own taxes, ∂2Wi∈S(ti)/∂t2i < 0 and ∂
2Wj /∈S(tj)/∂t2j < 0, and that the Hessian matrix
is semi-deﬁnite, guaranteeing a unique stable equilibrium tax vector.
Inserting equilibrium taxes in equilibrium quantities as displayed in equations (12) to
(20) in Section 3, reveals that we need to impose constraints on the parameters such
that equilibrium quantities are positive. Such non-negativity constraints essentially
boil down to the condition that the demand parameter a is larger than marginal
production cost c plus a multiple of marginal damages δ. In other words, these
non-negativity constraints represents a lower threshold a, such that if a ≥ a holds,
all quantities are positive for all m, 1 ≤ m ≤ n. Typically, the most restrictive
condition applies in the grand coalition (m = n) with the highest overall tax level.
For instance, under the No-BCA-regime, the non-negativity constraint is a ≥ c+mδ
for γ = 0 and a ≥ c + nδΨA/mΨB with ΨA = n2(m − 1) − n(m − 1)2 −m(m − 2),
ΨB = n
2−(m−1)(n+1), ΨA > 0 and ΨB > 0 for γ = 1. For γ = 0 it is immediately
evident that the condition is most restrictive ifm = n. However for γ = 1, this is also
the case because ΨA/mΨB increases in m. By setting m = n, the non-negativity
constraint is given by a > c + nδ for both values of γ. Clearly, an alternative
interpretation of this condition is that global marginal damages cannot be too high
compared to the diﬀerence a−c, which can be interpreted as the market size corrected
for production costs. For the BCA-regime, similar non-negativity constraints can be
derived, though they look much more complicated, but, in essence, they also require
that global marginal damages cannot be too high compared to the corrected market
size.
An other issue which is important for our analysis is that we want to consider sit-
uations for which t∗i ≥ t∗j holds. In our model (like in many other strategic trade
models), this is not automatically guaranteed. The reason is simple: in this game,
we have two market imperfections. On the one hand, there is Cournot-competition
in international trade. This implies that signatories, which internalize externalities
among its members, have an incentive to subsidize their consumers. However, they
also have an incentive to tax their producers in order to enforce a cartel solution,
i.e. stabilizing the market price by reducing output and output is reduced through
taxes. Diﬀerent from models with only two countries and no coalition formation,
in our model, signatory governments have an incentive to tax their producers. The
11Technically, quantities as a function of taxes as known from stage three are inserted in gov-
ernments' welfare functions and the welfare functions are diﬀerentiated with respect to own taxes.
Importantly, diﬀerent from the quantities displayed in section 3, which already used the information
of symmetry, quantities must be expressed as function of the full tax vector, and the symmetry
assumption can only be invoked after derivatives have been taken.
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reason is simple. In our model, taxes, which producers have to pay, are welfare
neutral as they constitute revenues for the government. The gross proﬁts of ﬁrms
(i.e proﬁts excluding tax bills) are maximized in a monopoly. As ﬁrms compete
non-cooperatively in each market as long as γ > 0, signatory governments aiming to
maximize the gross proﬁts of their ﬁrms have an incentive to collude. Trading oﬀ
ﬁrm's gross proﬁts for consumer surplus, leads to a subsidy if the market size is large
compared to production cost, represented by the parameters a and c in our model.
On the other hand, there is global pollution, which calls for taxes in order to reduce
damages. The importance of damages in the welfare function is represented by the
parameter δ in our model. Hence, as known from many strategic trade models, even
if the grand coalition forms, taxes may not be set at the Pigouvian level, i.e. not
equal to the sum of marginal damages nδ. They may be set lower or higher, de-
pending on the importance consumers and producers receive in governments' welfare
function. Thus, if the value of the parameter a is high compared to the value of
the parameters c and δ , signatory governments may chose a lower tax than non-
signatory governments and taxes may even be negative, i.e. governments subsidize
their ﬁrms. For instance, under the No-BTA-regime and γ = 0, t∗i (m) ≥ t∗j(m) > 0
if a ≤ c+ 2nδ but t∗i (m) < t∗j(m) < 0 if a > c+ 2nδ, both inequalities are compatible
with the non-negativity constraint derived above, i.e. a ≥ c+nδ. For γ = 1, one can
show that t∗i (m) > t
∗
j(m) and t
∗
j(m) < 0 always hold whereas t
∗
i (m) can be positive
or negative without violating the non-negativity constraint.
The upshot of all this is that in the context of our analysis it makes sense to impose
an upper bound threshold on a, denoted by a such that if a ≤ a , t∗i (m) ≥ t∗j(m) is
true. In other words, we assume damages to be signiﬁcant enough for governments
such that signatories choose higher taxes than non-signatories, which seems to be
the basic motivation to consider border tax adjustments for environmental reasons.
So even under the No-BCA-regime we assume damages to be suﬃciently strong such
that signatories choose higher taxes than non-signatories, t∗i (m) ≥ t∗j(m). For the
No-BCA-regime and γ = 0, this implies for instance a = c+ 2nδ. In the same spirit,
also under the BCA-regime, we can derive upper bound thresholds a such that if
a ≤ a , t∗i (m) ≥ t∗j(m) is always true.
Clearly, when comparing the two regimes, we need to assume that parameter a sat-
isﬁes both non-negativity constraints, thus the joint lower bound a is the maximum
of the two lower bounds. Also regarding the upper bound a, the joint upper bound
is the minimum of the two upper bounds.
Already under the No-BCA-regime, equilibrium taxes are huge terms, which are even
bigger under the BCA-regime. Even though we refer the reader to the analytic results
for the No-BCA-regime in Finus and Al Khourdajie (2018), we have not been able
to do the same for the BCA-regime. Hence, as we want to compare both regimes,
we need to resort to simulations, provide all detailed simulation results, conducted
with the mathematical software program Maple, upon request and list all qualitative
results on which we comment in Section 5 in Appendix 2.
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In the simulations, we consider three values of the TFV parameter: no TFV with
γ = 1, partial TFV with γ = 0.5, and full TFV with γ = 0. We also consider three
values for the damage parameter δ = {10, 50, 100}, assume n = 10 countries and
normalize the cost parameter by setting c = 0. We recall that we assume φ = 1
for the adjustment parameter for the reason provided above. For these parameter
values, the joint lower and upper bounds of parameter a are listed in the table below.
δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
a a a a a a
γ = 0 101 104 501 520 1001 1040
γ = 0.5 120 1000 590 5300 1250 10500
γ = 1 250 5000 1350 25000 2500 50000
As a(γ, δ) ≤ a(γ, δ) ≤ a(γ, δ) , each parameter space is divided into 6 a-values with
equidistant intervals such that 4(γ, δ) = a(γ,δ)−a(γ,δ)
5
, a1(γ, δ) = a(γ, δ), a2(γ, δ) =
a(γ, δ) +4(γ, δ), ..., a6(γ, δ) = a(γ, δ) + 54(γ, δ) = a(γ, δ). So for instance for γ = 0
and δ = 10, we have a1(γ, δ) = 101, a2(γ, δ) = 101.6, ..., a6(γ, δ) = 104. Roughly
speaking, for a given γ, moving from δ = 10 to δ = 50, all bounds are inﬂated by
a factor of 5 and by moving to δ = 100, they are inﬂated by a factor of 10. So the
diﬀerent values of the damage parameter δ can be considered as a sensitivity analysis
for which all qualitative results on which we report below are conﬁrmed to be robust.
(So absolute values of the parameters a, c and δ do not seem to matter but their
ratio.) Subsequently, in this but also the subsequent sections, we are interested in
the main qualitative results, not so much in the detailed quantitative results.
In a ﬁrst step, it is informative to compare equilibrium taxes under both regimes.
Result 1 - Comparing Equilibrium Taxes Across Regimes
Denote equilibrium taxes under both regimes with superscript No-BCA and BCA,
respectively, and assume 1 < m < n.
• Under the BCA-regime signatories' equilibrium taxes are higher than under the
No-BCA-regime: t∗BCAi > t
∗No−BCA
i ∀m.
• Under the BCA-regime non-signatories' equilibrium taxes are higher than under
the No-BCA-regime for γ = {0, 0.5}: t∗BCAj > t∗No−BCAj ∀m. For γ = 1,
t∗BCAj < t
∗No−BCA
j ∀m ≤ m˜, and t∗BCAj > t∗No−BCAj ∀m > m˜, with m˜ some
threshold, m˜ < n.
• Under the BCA-regime, total output is lower and hence total emissions are
lower than under No-BCA-regime for all m.
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The BCA-policy provides signatory governments with an additional strategic tool
to internalize externalities from emissions but also to protect their ﬁrms' compet-
itiveness in signatory markets. Furthermore, and importantly, it also serves as an
additional source for revenues, the collection of tariﬀs imposed on imports. There-
fore, taxes of signatory governments are higher under the BCA-regime than under
the No-BCA-regime.
From non-signatory governments' point of view, BCAs have the following implica-
tions. Firstly, their consumers need to pay higher prices for varieties supplied by
ﬁrms located in signatory countries. Secondly, their ﬁrms face an additional tax
burden at the borders to signatories' markets that will negatively aﬀect their proﬁts.
Thirdly, they face a loss of potential tax revenue, i.e. tax revenue generated by their
ﬁrms but of which some portion goes into signatory governments' coﬀers. Therefore,
non-signatory governments reaction is complex. On the one hand, non-signatory
governments could raise their taxes in order to protect their tax revenues. On the
other hand, they could lower their taxes to protect their consumers.
The incentive to protect domestic consumers decreases the lower the value of γ and
vanishes for the full TFV with γ = 0. In our simulations, this incentive is also
suﬃciently low for γ = 0.5, such that for the full and partial TFV, i.e. γ = {0, 0.5},
the revenue protection eﬀect dominates the consumer protection eﬀect and also non-
signatory governments choose a higher tax under the BCA- than under the No-BCA-
regime. For no TFV, i.e. γ = 1, this is also true if m > m˜, but is reversed if m ≤ m˜.
However, even in the last case, the overall tax level under the BCA-regime is higher
than under the No-BCA-regime such that total output and hence total emissions
are always lower for every coalition size (which does not include the grand coalition
because then No-BCA- and BCA-regime coincide).
5 First Stage
5.1 Results Open Membership
In this subsection, we derive stable coalitions under the No-BCA- and BCA-regime
as a Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous move open membership single coalition
game. We also evaluate those outcomes in terms of total welfare. In subsection
5.2, we provide a rationale for those results by considering various properties of our
coalition game. We then consider in subsection 5.3 whether and how our results
would change for a sequential coalition formation process and exclusive membership.
All results are supported by Appendix 2, which provides more detailed results than
the aggregate result, which we present in Results 2 and 3 below.
In order to evaluate the outcome in the two regimes, we consider a relative welfare
measure proposed in Eyckmans and Finus (2006) called the closing the gap index
(CGI), which is deﬁned as follows:
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CGI(m∗) :=
∑
k∈N Wqk(m
∗)−∑k∈N Wqk(m = 1)∑
k∈N Wqk(m = n)−
∑
k∈N Wqk(m = 1)
• 100 . (21)
This index measures to which extent a stable agreement with m∗ members closes
the gap between the grand coalition, a coalition including all countries (m = n ),
corresponding to the social optimum, and no agreement (m = 1), corresponding
to the non-cooperative equilibrium, the classical Nash equilibrium without coalition
formation. The CGI expresses this in percentage terms. Hence for instance if the
grand coalition is a stable agreement, the CGI is 100% whereas if no agreement is
stable, i.e. no non-trivial coalition with at least two members is stable, the CGI is
0%.12
Result 2 - Equilibrium Coalitions under Open Membership
Let m∗ denote the equilibrium size of a stable coalition under open membership and
let CGI(m∗) denote the closing the gap index of stable agreements with m∗ members
as deﬁned in equation (21). Then, under the No-BCA- and BCA-regime, we ﬁnd:
Table 1 to be inserted here
Result 2 clearly supports two messages. Under the No-BCA-regime stable agreements
are small if they exists at all. Only if the taste for variety parameter γ is suﬃciently
small will an agreement with at least two members be stable. But even for γ =
0, only an agreement with three countries is stable in our model.13 Accordingly,
the closing the gap index is at best small if not zero (see Table 4, Appendix 2
for further details). In our model, the strategic interaction among markets and
hence governments is related to the TFV-parameter γ: the larger γ, the lower the
taste for variety, the larger the strategic interaction. Under the No-BCA-regime,
strong strategic interaction means strong free-rider incentives. In contrast, under
the BCA-regime, large stable coalitions are possible, including the grand coalition,
with accordingly large values for the closing the gap index. BCAs put signatories
in a strong position, which is particular useful for them if there is strong strategic
interaction between signatories and non-signatories. For γ = 1 and γ = 0.5 we ﬁnd
the grand coalition to be stable in our simulation runs (and hence the CGI is 100%),
whereas for γ = 0, depending on the parameter values, we ﬁnd a coalition ranging
from m∗ = 6 to m∗ = 9 with a CGI still substantially above 85%. See Table 10 in
Appendix 2 for further details.
12In principle, the nominator may be negative and hence also the CGI. In these particular cases,
it seems sensible to indicate only that the CGI is negative but not to provide exact numbers. See
Result 4 below, in particular Table 2.
13For an analytic proof under the No-BCA-regime, see Finus and al Khourdajie (2018) for γ ∈
{0, 1}; a proof for γ = 0.5 is available upon request from the authors.
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5.2 Properties
In this subsection, we want to rationalize Result 2 above. For this we ﬁrst deﬁne some
properties and then report to which extent these properties hold in the two regimes.
The notation makes use of the fact that welfare depends only on membership and
on the size of coalitions m, but not on the composition of individual members due to
our assumption of ex-ante symmetric players, i.e. all players have the same welfare
function, and hence all signatories and all non-signatories have the same welfare,
though signatories and non-signatories have diﬀerent welfare because they choose
diﬀerent equilibrium strategies.
Let 1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1:
• Positive Externality: the move from m to m+ 1 exhibits a (strict) positive
externality if:
Wj /∈S(m+ 1) ≥ (>)Wj /∈S(m)
• Negative Externality: the move from m to m+ 1 exhibits a strict negative
externality if:
Wj /∈S(m+ 1) < Wj /∈S(m)
• Superadditivity: the move from m to m+ 1 is (strictly) superadditive if:
[m+ 1]Wi∈S(m) ≥ (>)mWi∈S(m) +Wj /∈S(m)
• Global Cohesiveness: a coalition game is globally (strictly) cohesive if:
nW (n) ≥ (>)mW (m) + [n−m]Wj(m) ∀m 6= n
• Cohesiveness: the move from m to m+ 1 is (strictly) cohesive if:
[m+ 1]Wi∈S(m+1)+[n−m− 1]Wj /∈S(m+1) ≥ (>)mWi∈S(m)+[n−m]Wj /∈S(m)
The ﬁrst four properties are related to positive features of coalition formation, the
last two properties are related to the normative dimension of coalition formation.14
In positive externality games, outsiders beneﬁt from the enlargement of the agree-
ment. This makes it attractive to remain a non-signatory. It is for this reason why
in many positive externality games, stable coalitions are small. This may be the
14For a discussion of these properties and other economic examples, see Bloch (2003) and Yi
(1997, 2003).
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case despite superadditivity holds, which provides an incentive to join a coalition.
Simply speaking, in many positive externality games, for larger coalitions, the su-
peradditivity eﬀect is smaller than the positive externality eﬀect. However, there
are games, in which even superadditivity fails to hold, in particular if coalition S
is small. Public provision games are typical examples. By enlarging the coalition,
signatories reduce their emissions from which also non-signatories beneﬁt (positive
externality game). Moreover, if emissions are strategic substitutes, non-signatories
increase their emissions as an optimal response. If this leakage is strong enough,
superadditivity may fail, which is particular the case for small coalitions, as there
are many non-signatories which free-ride. The formation of output cartels exhibits
similar features. Firms in the cartel reduce their output in order to stabilize prices
from which also ﬁrms outside the cartel beneﬁt. Their optimal response calls for
an increase in output, which may cause superadditivity to fail. Our strategic trade-
environment game combines the features of an output cartel and a public good game
and hence exhibits similar features under the No-BCA-regime. In contrast, in neg-
ative externality games, outsiders have an incentive to join coalition S. It is easy
to show that in a game which is fully superadditive (i.e. superadditivity holds for
every move m to m + 1) and exhibits a full negative externality (i.e. every move m
to m+ 1 is associated with negative externalities), the grand coalition is the unique
stable coalition in the simultaneous move open membership single coalition game
(Weikard 2009). Under the BCA-regime, there are cases where the coalition game
exhibits negative externalities, which we discuss in detail below.
Global cohesiveness simply means that global welfare in the grand coalition is larger
than in any other coalition. This property holds strictly in any externality game and
hence also in our strategic trade-environment game as all externalities are internalized
in the grand coalition by assumption. A more speciﬁc property is cohesiveness which
implies that the move from a coalition of size m to m+ 1 is associated with a global
welfare gain. If this holds for every move, we say the game is fully cohesive, i.e.
global welfare increases continuously each time a coalition is enlarged. Clearly, in a
game which such a feature, there is a normative motivation to search for large stable
coalitions even if the grand coalition is not stable. Note that in games, which exhibit a
full positive externality and which are fully superadditive, full cohesiveness is implied:
every enlargement beneﬁts outsiders and those players involved in the enlargement
gain at the aggregate. The No-BCA-regime generally displays this property. In
contrast, in negative externality games, it is less obvious that full cohesiveness holds.
Though the grand coalitions generates the largest global welfare, global welfare may
not continuously increase with the enlargement of coalitions and in fact there may
even be intermediate coalitions with lower welfare than in the status quo with no
agreement. This may happen if the negative externality eﬀect is very strong. As we
will discuss below, the BCA-regime may show this feature.
Equipped with these deﬁnitions, we now analyze the driving forces under the two
regimes which explains Result 2. Appendix 2 supports the discussion with detailed
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results.
Under the No-BCA-regime, we ﬁnd that the full positive externality property holds
generally. Whenever the coalition is enlarged, signatories decrease their outputs
whereas non-signatories expand their outputs (as long as γ > 1), though the overall
output (and hence environmental damages) decrease. So non-signatories beneﬁt
from lower damages, higher prices and a relocation of production, compensating for
a possible loss of consumer surplus due to high taxes by signatory governments. Full
superadditivity holds for γ = 0.5 and γ = 0 but fails for γ = 1 (see Table 1, Appendix
2). In fact, for γ = 1, for every move from m to m + 1 superadditivity fails, except
for the last move from n − 1 to n. The reason is that the leakage eﬀect increases
with the value of γ. Given that superadditivity is a necessary condition for internal
stability in positive externality games, it is not surprising that we found that no
non-trivial coalition is stable for γ = 1. But even if full superadditivity holds, as
for γ = 0.5 and γ = 0, positive externalities are even stronger, which explains small
stable coalitions with m∗ = 2 and m∗ = 3, respectively. Also note that in line with
other positive externality games with ex-ante symmetric players, non-signatories are
always better oﬀ than signatories, Wi∈S(m) < Wj /∈S(m) for every m, 1 < m < n. All
countries enjoy the same consumer surplus and suﬀer the same damages but gross
proﬁts are lower in signatory countries due to the lower outputs of their ﬁrms. Hence,
the coalition game resembles a kind of n-player (symmetric) chicken game (in pure
strategies) with either no or a small number of chickens in equilibrium. Given that
that full cohesiveness holds generally in the No-BCA-regime, stresses the well-known
paradox of cooperation mentioned in the Introduction. Despite larger coalitions
would be associated with a global welfare gain even if the grand coalition cannot be
obtained, only small coalitions are stable which cannot or hardly can improve upon
the status quo without agreement.
Under the BCA-regime, we ﬁnd that full superadditivity holds throughout all simula-
tions as signatories can now better control the leakage eﬀect. For γ = 0, we also have
full positive externalities. However, for γ = 0.5 and γ = 1, we do not have generally
positive externalities, in fact, only if the damage parameter δ is very high compared
to the demand parameter a, i.e. for very small values of a(γ, δ), and small coalitions,
i.e. small m (see Table 6, Appendix 2). That is, non-signatories enjoy positive exter-
nalities because the reduction of damages matters a lot and the strategic advantage
of signatories is still moderate due to smaller agreements and/or small γ. However,
if the reduction of damages is slightly less important, coalitions are suﬃciently large
and/or γ is suﬃciently large so that the strategic advantage of signatories is suf-
ﬁciently large, then signatories impose negative externalities on outsiders through
BCAs. These are situations in which signatories extract high tariﬀ revenues from
non-signatories, consumers in non-signatory countries are hit hard due to high taxes
of signatory governments but non-signatories do not beneﬁt suﬃciently from lower
damages to compensate these negative externalities. This is one line of arguments
which explains why large stable coalitions emerge under the BCA-regime. Another,
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and additional line of arguments emerges by noting that Wi∈S(m) < Wj /∈S(m) holds
now only for some larger coalitions for γ = 0, but is reversed in all other cases,
i.e. Wi∈S(m) > Wj /∈S(m) (see Table 5, Appendix 2). It is also interesting to note
that signatories are always better oﬀ under the BCA- than under No-BCA-regime
(WBCAi∈S (m) > W
N0−BCA
i∈S (m) for all m, 1 < m < n), and that for non-signatories
this is reversed (WBCAj /∈S (m) < W
N0−BCA
j /∈S (m) generally for γ = 1 and γ = 0.5 and
for γ = 0 at least for large coalitions (see Table 11, Appendix 2). So compared
to the No-BCA-regime, with border carbon adjustments the situation of signatories
improves and that of non-signatories worsens, leading to larger stable agreements.
In terms of global welfare, for γ = 1 and γ = 0.5 the grand coalition is stable and
hence the optimum is achieved due to the (general) property global cohesiveness and
for γ = 0 full cohesiveness holds (see Table 8, Appendix 2) and hence any coalition
larger than m∗ = 3 as under the No-BCA-regime is associated with larger global
welfare under the BCA-regime with m∗ ranging from 6 to 9 (i.e. m∗ = 6−9 in Table
1).
5.3 Alternative Coalition Formation Games
In this subsection, we want to analyze how robust our conclusions are regarding the
assumptions of our coalition formation game. Apart from this technical point, and
even more important, we are interested in what would change if agreements are not
open to accession of outsiders (open membership) but are subject to an approval
process by current members (exclusive membership). Therefore, we consider two
alternative features: a) a sequential instead of a simultaneous coalition formation
process and b) exclusive instead of open membership. We may note that though
environmental agreements are typical of the open membership type, trade agreements
classically feature exclusive membership, including accession to the WTO or the
European market.
The standard assumption in the literature on coalition formation is a simultane-
ous coalition formation (see Bloch 2003 and Yi 1997, 2003). However, in reality,
agreements typically form sequentially, with some initiators moving ﬁrst and some
laggards joining later. The simplest extension of our game could assume that two
countries form a coalition in a ﬁrst instance. In a sequential process others may join if
they beneﬁt from accession. In this sequential process, any intermediate coalition of
size m must ﬁrst of all be internally stable. Outsiders will accede to an intermediate
coalition of size m if this coalition is not externally stable. However, in the case of
symmetric players, this implies that a coalition of size m+1 is strictly internally sta-
ble. Thus, if there is a sequence of coalitions m in the interval 1 < m ≤ m ≤ n which
are all strictly internally stable (Wi∈S(m)−Wi/∈S(m− 1) > 0), then there will be a
sequence of accessions until m is reached. If m = n, then m is externally stable by
deﬁnition (as no outsider is left) and if m < n, and m = m+ 1 is internally unstable,
then m is also externally stable. Hence, in such a sequence, m∗ = m emerges.
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Technically, we can summarize internal stability, Wi∈S(m) −Wi/∈S(m − 1) ≥ 0, and
external stability, Wj /∈S(m) − Wj /∈S(m + 1) ≥ 0 (under open membership) into a
stability function Φ(m) := Wi∈S(m)−Wi/∈S(m− 1) with a coalition of size m being
internally stable if Φ(m) ≥ 0 and externally stable if Φ(m+1) < 0. Tables 3 and 9 in
Appendix 2 display the result for the stability function for the No-BCA- and BCA-
regime, respectively. For both regimes, Φ(m) > 0 for a sequence of coalitions, m,
1 < m ≤ m ≤ n, implying that all coalitions smaller than m are externally unstable
except m and hence m∗ = m. (For γ = 1 under the No-BCA-regime, we have
Φ(m) < 0 for all m > 1 and hence m∗ = 1 is obvious.) The upshot of all this is that
the results obtained above and summarized in Result 2 for a simultaneous coalition
formation process would be exactly the same for a sequential coalition formation
process and hence our results are robust regarding this modiﬁcation of assumption.
Let us now move to the second alternative assumption of exclusive membership.
Consider ﬁrst our original assumption of a simultaneous coalition formation process.
Of course, also for exclusive membership, a coalition of size m can only be stable if
it is internally stable, i.e. Φ(m) ≥ 0. Moreover, if the enlarged coalition m+ 1 is not
internally stable, then m is externally stable. That is, outsiders have no incentive
to join coalition m anyway and hence like under open membership coalition m is
externally stable. However, if to the contrary, m is externally unstable under open
membership (and hence m + 1 is strictly internally stable), exclusive membership
could make a diﬀerence. The reason is that the current members of coalition of
size m would only agree to accession if and only if they are better oﬀ. Signatories
are better oﬀ (worse oﬀ) if they enjoy a positive internal spillover (negative internal
spillover).
Let 1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1:
• Positive Internal Spillover: the move from m to m + 1 exhibits (strict)
positive internal spillovers if:
Wi∈S(m+ 1) ≥ (>)Wi∈S(m)
• Negative Internal Spillover: the move from m to m + 1 exhibits strict
negative internal spillovers if:
Wi∈S(m+ 1) < Wi∈S(m)
There are two main reasons for possible negative internal spillovers in our model.
Under the No-BCA-regime, though more countries joining an agreement means less
free-riders, it also means more ambitious targets, which in the context of strong
leakage eﬀects may lower the welfare of signatories. We observe negative internal
spillovers under the No-BCA-regime for small coalitions and γ = 1 (see Table 2,
Appendix 2). Under the BCA-regime there is another, very selﬁsh reason. Signa-
tories enjoy a strong position towards non-signatories. If the number of signatories
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has reached some level m˜, the basis to extract tariﬀ revenues from non-signatories
becomes smaller, so that the current members do not beneﬁt from a further expan-
sion of the agreement. We ﬁnd negative internal spillovers under the BCA-regime
for γ = 1 and γ = 0.5 for a threshold coalition size m˜ which can be substantially
smaller than the grand coalition (see Table 7, Appendix 2).
Now, under the No-BCA-regime, exclusive membership will not make a diﬀerence
because m˜ is much larger than the largest internally stable coalition m. For γ = 1,
Φ(m) < 0 for all m > 1 and hence all larger coalitions are anyway externally stable
and so m∗ = 1. For γ = 0.5, m˜ = 10, Φ(m) > 0 for m = 2 but Φ(m) < 0 for
all m > 2 and hence m∗ = 2. For γ = 0, again, m˜ = 10, Φ(m) > 0 for m = 2
and m = 3 but Φ(m) < 0 for all m > 3 and hence m = 2 is not externally stable
whereas m = 3 is so that m∗ = 3 (see Table 3, Appendix 2). Hence, m∗ = m under
exclusive membership as displayed in Result 3 below which is the same as under open
membership as reported in Result 2 above.
Result 3 - Equilibrium Coalitions under Exclusive Membership
Assume exclusive membership. Let m∗ denote the size of stable coalition(s) under
both regimes and consider a sequential coalition formation process. Then, under the
No-BCA- and BCA-regime, we ﬁnd:
Table 2 to be inserted here
Under the BCA-regime, a more interesting but also more alarming pattern emerges,
which is illustrated with an example in Figure 1, which assumes γ = 1, δ = 10 and
chooses an intermediate value for parameter a , namely a4(δ, γ) = 3100.
Figure 1 about here
For γ = 1 and γ = 0.5 we recall that all coalitions m in the interval 1< m ≤ m = n
(with n = 10 in our simulation runs) are strictly internally stable (see Table 9 in
Appendix 2). Consequently, in this interval, non-signatories have an incentive to join
any intermediate coalition. For the example, the stability function Φ(m) is shown in
Figure 1a. Moreover, for smaller coalitions we ﬁnd positive internal spillovers up to
coalitions of size m˜ < m = n and from m˜ + 1 to m = n negative internal spillovers.
For the example, Figure 1b illustrates this which plots welfare of signatories as a
function of the size of the coalition, m, with m˜ = 5. Hence, all coalitions up to m˜ are
not externally stable and all coalitions m˜ + 1 to m = n are externally stable under
exclusive membership. Hence for a simultaneous coalition formation process, any
coalition m, m˜ ≤ m 5 m = n is stable and therefore m∗ is not unique for γ = 1 and
γ = 0.5. In other words, compared to open membership, also smaller coalitions are
stable under exclusive membership. In the example, m∗ = 5−10 (i.e all coalitions of
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size 5 to 10 are stable, m∗L = 5 and m
∗
H = 10 with reference to Table 2). In contrast,
for γ = 0, m˜ > m and in fact m˜ = n, so we have positive internal spillovers for every
move up to the grand coalition. So all coalitions up to m = m − 1 are externally
unstable, m = m is externally stable (because m + 1 is internally unstable) and
consequently, we have a unique stable coalition m∗ = m which is the same as under
open membership.
Finally, we may consider what changes if we assume a sequential coalition formation
process for exclusive membership. Under the No-BCA-regime it is immediately clear
that this will make no diﬀerence. The same is true under the BCA-regime and γ = 0,
but for γ = 1 and γ = 0.5 the process of enlargement would stop at m = m˜ and
hence m∗ = m˜ would be the unique stable equilibrium, the smallest stable coalition
which we found for a simultaneous coalition formation process, denoted by m∗L in
Table 2. Thus, a unique equilibrium emerges for a sequential coalition process. In
our example, m∗ = 5.
So viewed together, exclusive membership makes no diﬀerence for the No-BCA-
regime but may lead to smaller stable coalitions for the BCA-regime. This is the case
for γ = 1 and γ = 0.5 where the grand coalition emerges under open membership,
but now with exclusive membership, either additional smaller coalitions are stable
for a simultaneous coalition formation process or a unique smaller coalition is stable
for a sequential coalition formation process.
Important is now to understand how this may aﬀect global welfare. For this we
display in Result 3 above for the BCA-regime the CGI for the smallest, denoted
m∗L, and the largest stable coalition, denoted m
∗
H , for the simultaneous coalition
formation process, noting that m∗L would be the unique stable coalition size in a
sequential coalition formation process. This leads to far less positive conclusions
under the BCA-regime. For instance, in our example, m∗ = m˜= 5 in a sequential
coalition formation process. However, as is evident from Figure 1c, already at m = 3,
global welfare starts to decline continuously with an enlargement of the coalition until
reaching the lowest global welfare at m = 8, then picking up again until the grand
coalition is reached. In this example, global welfare at m∗ = m˜= 5 is even slightly
smaller than in the status quo with no agreement. Hence, the CGI would be negative,
and the same is true in this example for m = 6 to m = 9 (with even lower global
welfare) which would be additionally stable for a simultaneous coalition formation
process. Thus, exclusive membership may lead to much worse outcomes than open
membership under the BCA-regime, with outcomes which are even worse than if no
agreement was reached. As Result 3 suggests for γ = 1 and γ = 0.5 this is the case
for the larger values of parameter a, namely a4(δ, γ) to a6(δ, γ) .
The fact that global welfare may decrease in m for some intermediate coalition sizes
means technically that under the BCA-regime not each enlargement is associated
with cohesiveness, very diﬀerent from the No-BCA-regime which is always fully
cohesive (see Appendix 2, in particular the summary of the general result under
the No-BCA-regime and Table 8 for the BCA-regime). The reason is that under
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the BCA-regime the negative externality eﬀect on non-signatories can be so strong
that, despite superadditivity, global welfare declines for some intermediate coalitions,
which is the case in our simulations for γ = 1 and γ = 0.5.
Overall, this allows us to draw at least two important policy conclusions. Firstly,
the general fear by most economists that any restriction on trade may cause large
welfare losses, even if motivated by environmental concerns, is strongly supported by
our model. BCAs may be associated with a global welfare loss if full cooperation is
not achieved. Secondly, and nevertheless, border carbon adjustments can be a useful
tool to enforce environmental agreements and to increase global welfare but mem-
bership should not be restricted because some governments hijack this instrument
for their own interest. Border carbon adjustments should support an international
environmental agreement and hence should remain open to all countries which would
like to join for the global good.
6 Summary and Conclusion
In a stylized intra-industry trade model with horizontal product diﬀerentiation and
taste for variety (TFV) by consumers we studied the formation, stability and success
of international climate agreements. In the tradition of the game-theoretic literature
on international environmental agreements (IEAs), we modeled a three stage game
in which governments ﬁrst decide whether to join a climate agreement, then decide
on their policy levels and ﬁnally ﬁrms choose their outputs. The model captures
the strategic interaction between signatories and non-signatories with an endogenous
choice of strategies at each stage. We considered two regimes. Under the ﬁrst regime,
governments have an emission tax at their avail to correct externalities, under the
second regime, signatories to a climate agreement have an additional policy option,
namely to impose tariﬀs on imports. The tariﬀs, the border carbon adjustments
(BCAs), are chosen such that eﬀective tax on imports is the same as the tax on
domestic production. We labeled the ﬁrst regime No-BCA-regime and the second
BCA-regime. Output-based rebates (OBRs) were not part of the BCA-regime as
they are not in accordance with the strong polluters principle, may be diﬃcult to
justify within WTO-rules but also because we could show that our BCA-regime is
already able to deliver what most scholars intuitively suspect, namely, it enforces
larger stable and eﬀective climate agreements.
We showed that BCAs are a game changer in several respects. Firms located in
signatory countries, facing higher taxes than their rivals in non-signatory countries,
now play on equal terms with their rivals, at least in their home market. Thus, the
diﬀerence in proﬁts is reduced through BCAs, though it does not vanish. Signatory
governments also beneﬁt from tariﬀ revenues, which at the same time constitute a
loss of tax revenues to non-signatory governments. However, not all eﬀects work
to the absolute or comparative advantage of signatory countries. Without BCAs,
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though the consumer surplus is negatively aﬀected by absolute tax levels, consumers
in signatory and non-signatory enjoy the same utility. Under the BCA-regime, this
changes, consumers in signatories are disadvantaged as they faces higher prices than
consumers in non-signatory countries. Nevertheless, at the aggregate welfare level of
countries, the ﬁrst two eﬀects dominate the third eﬀect. That is, signatory's welfare
increases compared to the No-BCA regime, and in most cases the reverse is true for
non-signatory countries.
A variation of this theme showed up in the properties of the coalition formation
game. Under the No-BCA regime, non-signatories' welfare increases with the ex-
pansion of the agreement, which we called positive externalities. This is a result of
the non-excludability of public good provision. Larger climate agreements implies
more ambitious emission reduction targets by signatories from which non-signatories
beneﬁt at no cost. Moreover, in the context of trade, non-signatories beneﬁt from
a relocation of production to their countries. This leakage eﬀect also lowers the
gains from cooperation to signatories, reﬂected in the properties superadditivity and
positive internal spillovers. That is, an expansion of an agreement may neither be
beneﬁcial for signatories at the aggregate (superadditivity fails) nor individual level
(internal spillovers are not positive but negative) if leakage eﬀects are too strong. We
showed that this may be particularly true under two conditions. Firstly, as long as
participation in an agreement is below a threshold, the number of free-riders is too
large. Secondly, if the taste for variety of consumers is low, competition among ﬁrms
for market shares is ﬁerce, and hence the strategic interaction among governments
is particularly strong under the No-BCA-regime. Altogether this explain why under
the No-BCA-regime for a suﬃciently low taste of variety no climate agreement is
stable, but even for higher levels of the taste for variety at best only small agree-
ments are stable. That is, under the No-BCA-regime, agreements can at best only
marginally close the gap between no and full cooperation in terms of global welfare.
In contrast, under the BCA-regime, large agreements can be stable, including an
agreement comprising all countries (grand coalition). Particularly for those situa-
tions with strong strategic interaction among countries, i.e. low taste for variety, the
grand coalition is stable. But even for a high taste for variety, stable agreements are
much larger than under the No-BCA-regime, and close the gap between no and full
cooperation by a substantial amount. BCAs help not only to reduce carbon leakage,
but extract tax revenues from ﬁrms located in non-signatory countries. The game
change implied that superadditivity always holds and that non-signatories may no
longer enjoy positive externalities but may suﬀer from negative externalities if agree-
ments are sequentially increased. Thus, BCAs strengthen the incentive of countries
to join a climate agreement. It is for this reason that irrespective of whether coalition
formation is modeled as a one-shot or sequential game, self-enforcing climate agree-
ments are large and successful (in welfare terms) under open membership. That
is, if accession to an agreement cannot be denied, as this is common practice for
almost all international environmental agreements, BCAs accomplish for what they
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are designed. That is, in equilibrium, either BCAs only serve as a threat but are not
implemented under full participation, or they are only imposed on a small group of
outsiders. However, we also showed that for smaller agreements of intermediate size,
the welfare cost of BCAs may be very large, sometimes implying lower global welfare
than in the status quo with no agreement. This may happen if negative externalities
to non-signatories are higher than the beneﬁts to signatories, which is particularly
likely in our model if the strategic interaction among countries is strong, so low levels
for the taste for variety. We showed that if climate agreements, in the tradition of
most trade agreements, are of the exclusive membership type (i.e current signato-
ries vote on the application for accession by outsiders), smaller stable agreements
may emerge, with possible negative impacts for global welfare as described above.
The reason is that despite outsiders may want to join the climate agreement, this
may not be in the strategic interest of current signatories. From a pure selﬁsh point
of view, signatories' welfare may only increase up to some threshold membership
and then declines. Above the threshold, any additional reduction of environmental
damages and further eﬀort to strengthen domestic ﬁrms' competitiveness is not out-
weighed by the reduction of tariﬀ revenues, as result of a shrinking tariﬀ revenue
base. Thus, in order to avoid that BCAs serve the narrow interest of a few countries,
it clearly emerges from our analysis that climate agreements should remain open to
all countries.
Our analysis made some simplifying assumptions. In the following, we brieﬂy discuss
the implication of relaxing these assumptions. Firstly, we did not consider OBRs
for the reasons given above. With OBRs, signatories would gain an even strong
position towards non-signatories, which, as we have shown, is not necessary to make
BCAs successful. We expect that the possible negative impacts under exclusive
membership would be more pronounced. Secondly, we could allow for asymmetric
welfare functions of countries. Though more realistic, the driving forces/properties
identiﬁed in our model with ex-ante symmetric players would not disappear. If tariﬀ
and tax revenues were used to compensate those beneﬁting from cooperation less
than others, asymmetry does not have to be an obstacle but may be an asset for
cooperation as this emerges from asymmetric IEA models for instance by Finus and
McGinty (2015) and Weikard (2009). Thirdly, our model allowed for the relocation
of production but did not consider the relocation ﬁrms as a result of diﬀerent taxes in
signatory and non-signatory countries. Hence, an interesting extension could build on
strategic models with endogenous plant location, like in Hoel (1997), Markusen et al.
(1993) and Motta and Thisse (1994) by adding the perspective of BCAs. We expect
that without transportation and relocation costs, the knife-edge equilibrium in these
models with a race to the bottom would not disappear with border adjustments only
and hence BCAs would be only successful if complemented by other trade measures
like OBRs.
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Appendix 1
Non-signatories' Markets
The proﬁt of ﬁrm i located in a signatory country in market l is given by pili =
qli(pli − c − ti). Substituting the inverse demand function in equation (4) in the
text, after the appropriate changes in notation, we derive the following ﬁrst order
condition:
∂pili
∂qli
= a− c− ti − (2− γ)qli − γQl. = 0 ⇐⇒ qli = 1
2− γ [a− c− ti − γQl.] (1)
where Ql. is the total quantity consumed in market l . The right-hand side expression
in equation (1) is the replacement function of ﬁrm i (qli = Ri(Ql.) which is strictly
downward sloping, except for γ=0 in which it is a horizontal line. It is evident that
a necessary condition for positive quantities is a > c.
The proﬁt of ﬁrm j in a non-signatory country in market l is given by pilj = qlj(plj −
c− tj) which leads to the following ﬁrst order condition:
∂pilj
∂qlj
= a− c− tj − (2− γ)qlj − γQl. = 0 ⇐⇒ qlj = 1
2− γ [a− c− tj − γQl.] (2)
where the right-hand side expression in equation (2) is the replacement function of
ﬁrm j (qlj = Ri(Ql.). By summing the m ﬁrst order conditions in (1) and and the
n − m ﬁrst order conditions in (2), we derive the aggregate replacement function∑
i∈N Ri(Ql.):
∑
i∈N
Ri(Ql.) := Ql. =
1
2− γ [n(a− c)−mti − (n−m)tj − nγQl.] . (3)
The aggregate replacement function is downward sloping over the entire domain and
hence the equilibrium is unique. Solving (3) for Ql., gives:
Q∗l. =
n(a− c)−m(t∗i − t∗j)− nt∗j
(n− 1)γ + 2 . (4)
1
By substituting Q∗l. in (1) and (2), we derive q
∗
li in (11) and q
∗
lj in (12) in the text.
Signatories' Markets:
The procedure is similar as explained above. The proﬁt of ﬁrm i in market k is given
by piki = qki(pki − c− ti) which leads to the following ﬁrst order condition:
∂piki
∂qki
= a− c− ti− (2− γ)qki− γQk. = 0 ⇐⇒ qki = 1
2− γ [a− c− ti − γQk.] . (5)
The proﬁt of ﬁrm j in market k is given by pikj = qkj(pkj − c− tj − φ(ti− tj)), which
gives:
∂pikj
∂qkj
= a− c− tj − φ(ti − tj)− (2− γ)qkj − γQk. = 0 (6)
⇐⇒ qkj = 1
2− γ [a− c− tj − tj − φ(ti − tj)− γQk.]
Summing up the ﬁrst order conditions in (5) and (6), gives Q∗k. in (16) in the text,
which upon substituting in (5) and (6) above, gives q∗ki in (14) and q
∗
kj in (15) in
the text. in the text, (17) is derived by summing (11) over all n−m non-signatory
markets and (14) over allm signatory markets. Similarly, (18) is derived by summing
(12) over all n−m signatory markets and (15) over all m non-signatory markets.
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No-BCA-Regime 
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General Results: For all coalition sizes, non-signatories’ welfare is (strictly) larger than signatories’ welfare. Every enlargement of coalitions from m  to 
m 1  generates strictly positive externalities for non-signatories (full strict positive externality) and is associated with full cohesiveness. This can been 
shown analytically. For {0,1}  , see Finus/Al Khourdajie  (2018); results for 0.5   are available upon request.  
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Table 1: Superadditivity* 
 Parameter a Enlargement of Coalition 
  1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 
 
1a ( , )    - - - - - - - - + 
 
2a ( , )   - - - - - - - - + 
1    3a ( , )   - - - - - - - - + 
 
4a ( , )   - - - - - - - - + 
 
5a ( , )   - - - - - - - - + 
 
6a ( , )   - - - - - - - - + 
 Parameter a Enlargement of Coalition 
  1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + + + + + 
 
2a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
0.5    3a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
4a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
5a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
6a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 Parameter a Enlargement of Coalition 
  1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + + + + + 
 
2a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
0    3a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
4a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
5a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
6a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
* +: holds strictly. -: fails. Can be proved analytically. For {0,1}  , see Finus/Al Khourdajie  (2018); results for 0.5   are available upon request. 
  
5 
 
Table 2: Internal Spillovers of Enlargement of Coalitions* 
 Parameter a Enlargement of Coalition 
  1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 
 
1a ( , )    - - - - + + + + + 
 
2a ( , )   - - - - + + + + + 
1    3a ( , )   - - - - + + + + + 
 
4a ( , )   - - - - + + + + + 
 
5a ( , )   - - - - + + + + + 
 
6a ( , )   - - - - + + + + + 
 Parameter a Enlargement of Coalition 
  1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + + + + + 
 
2a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
0.5    3a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
4a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
5a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
6a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 Parameter a Enlargement of Coalition 
  1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + + + + + 
 
2a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
0    3a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
4a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
5a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
6a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
* +: (strictly) positive. -: (strictly) negative internal spillovers. 
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Table 3: Stability Function (
i S j S
(m) : W (m) W (m 1)     ) * 
 Parameter a Coalition Size 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
1a ( , )    - - - - - - - - - 
 
2a ( , )   - - - - - - - - - 
1    3a ( , )   - - - - - - - - - 
 
4a ( , )   - - - - - - - - - 
 
5a ( , )   - - - - - - - - - 
 
6a ( , )   - - - - - - - - - 
 Parameter a Coalition Size 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
1a ( , )    + - - - - - - - - 
 
2a ( , )   + - - - - - - - - 
0.5    3a ( , )   + - - - - - - - - 
 
4a ( , )   + - - - - - - - - 
 
5a ( , )   + - - - - - - - - 
 
6a ( , )   + - - - - - - - - 
 Parameter a Coalition Size 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
1a ( , )    + + - - - - - - - 
 
2a ( , )   + + - - - - - - - 
0    3a ( , )   + + - - - - - - - 
 
4a ( , )   + + - - - - - - - 
 
5a ( , )   + + - _ - - - - - 
 
6a ( , )   + + - - - - - - - 
* +: strictly positive. -: negative. Can be proved analytically. For {0,1}  , see Finus/Al Khourdajie  (2018); results for 0.5   are available upon request. 
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Table 4: Global Welfare of Stable Coalitions* 
 Parameter a m* 10   50   100   
   CGI(m*) % CGI(m*) % CGI(m*) % 
 
1a ( , )   1 0 0 0 
 
2a ( , )   1 0 0 0 
1   3a ( , )   1 0 0 0 
 
4a ( , )   1 0 0 0 
 
5a ( , )   1 0 0 0 
 
6a ( , )   1 0 0 0 
 Parameter a m* 10   50   100   
   CGI(m*) % CGI(m*) % CGI(m*) % 
 
1a ( , )   2 1 1 1 
 
2a ( , )   2 1 1 1 
0.5   3a ( , )   2 1 1 1 
 
4a ( , )   2 1 1 1 
 
5a ( , )   2 1 1 1 
 
6a ( , )   2 1 1 1 
 Parameter a m* 10   50   100   
   CGI(m*) % CGI(m*) % CGI(m*) % 
 
1a ( , )   3 7.3 7.3 7.3 
 
2a ( , )   3 7.3 7.3 7.3 
0   3a ( , )   3 7.3 7.3 7.3 
 
4a ( , )   3 7.3 7.3 7.3 
 
5a ( , )   3 7.3 7.3 7.3 
 
6a ( , )   3 7.3 7.3 7.3 
* m*  is the same for open and exclusive membership and for a simultaneous and sequential coalition formation process. 
8 
 
BCA-Regime 
 
 
9 
 
General Results: Every enlargement of coalitions from m  to m 1  is associated with superadditivity. Signatories’ welfare is always higher with BCAs 
than without BCAs, which is not always the case for non-signatories; see Table 11. 
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Table 5: Welfare of Signatories minus Welfare of Non-Signatories* 
 Parameter a Coalition Size 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + + + + 
 
2a ( , )   + + + + + + + + 
1    3a ( , )   + + + + + + + + 
 
4a ( , )   + + + + + + + + 
 
5a ( , )   + + + + + + + + 
 
6a ( , )   + + + + + + + + 
 Parameter a Coalition Size 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + + + + 
 
2a ( , )   + + + + + + + + 
0.5    3a ( , )   + + + + + + + + 
 
4a ( , )   + + + + + + + + 
 
5a ( , )   + + + + + + + + 
 
6a ( , )   + + + + + + + + 
 Parameter a Coalition Size 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
1a ( , )    + - - - - - - - 
 
2a ( , )   + + + - - - - - 
0    3a ( , )   + + + - - - - - 
 
4a ( , )   + + + - - - - - 
 
5a ( , )   + + + - - - - - 
 
6a ( , )   + + + + - - - - 
* Difference +: (strictly) positive; -: negative. 
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Table 6: Externality to Non-signatories of Enlargement of Coalitions* 
 Parameter a Enlargement of Coalition 
  1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + + - - 
 
2a ( , )   - - - - - - - - 
1    3a ( , )   - - - - - - - - 
 
4a ( , )   - - - - - - - - 
 
5a ( , )   - - - - - - - - 
 
6a ( , )   - - - - - - - - 
 Parameter a Enlargement of Coalition 
  1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + + + - 
 
2a ( , )   + - - + + + + + 
0.5    3a ( , )   + - - - - - - - 
 
4a ( , )   - - - - - - - + 
 
5a ( , )   - - - - - - - + 
 
6a ( , )   - - - - - - - + 
 Parameter a Enlargement of Coalition 
  1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + + + + 
 
2a ( , )   + + + + + + + + 
0    3a ( , )   + + + + + + + + 
 
4a ( , )   + + + + + + + + 
 
5a ( , )   + + + + + + + + 
 
6a ( , )   + + + + + + + + 
* +: (strictly) positive; -: negative externality. 
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Table 7: Internal Spillovers of Enlargement of Coalitions* 
 Parameter a Enlargement of Coalition 
  1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + + + + - 
 
2a ( , )   + + + + + - - - - 
1    3a ( , )   + + + + + - - - - 
 
4a ( , )   + + + + - - - - - 
 
5a ( , )   + + + + - - - - - 
 
6a ( , )   + + + + - - - - - 
 Parameter a Enlargement of Coalition 
  1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + + + + - 
 
2a ( , )   + + + + + + + - - 
0.5    3a ( , )   + + + + + - - - - 
 
4a ( , )   + + + + + - - - - 
 
5a ( , )   + + + + - - - - - 
 
6a ( , )   + + + + - - - - - 
 Parameter a Enlargement of Coalition 
  1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + + + + + 
 
2a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
0    3a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
4a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
5a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
6a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
* +: (strictly) positive. -: negative internal spillovers. 
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Table 8: Cohesiveness* 
 Parameter a Enlargement of Coalition 
  1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + + + + + 
 
2a ( , )   + + + + - - - - + 
1    3a ( , )   + + + - - - - + + 
 
4a ( , )   + + - - - - - + + 
 
5a ( , )   + - - - - - - + + 
 
6a ( , )   - - - - - - - + + 
 Parameter a Enlargement of Coalition 
  1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + + + + + 
 
2a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
0.5    3a ( , )   + + + + -
1 - + + + 
 
4a ( , )   + + - - - - + + + 
 
5a ( , )   - - - - - - + + + 
 
6a ( , )   - - - - - - + + + 
 Parameter a Enlargement of Coalition 
  1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + + + + + 
 
2a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
0    3a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
4a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
5a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
6a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
* Cohesiveness holds (strictly): +; is violated:-. 1 holds for 50   and 100   but is positive for 10  . 
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Table 9: Stability Function 
i S j S
(m) : W (m) W (m 1)     * 
 Parameter a Coalition Size 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + + + + + 
 
2a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
1    3a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
4a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
5a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
6a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 Parameter a Coalition Size 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + + + + + 
 
2a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
0.5    3a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
4a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
5a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 
6a ( , )   + + + + + + + + + 
 Parameter a Coalition Size 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + - - - - 
 
2a ( , )   + + + + + + + - - 
0    3a ( , )   + + + + + + + - - 
 
4a ( , )   + + + + + + + + - 
 
5a ( , )   + + + + + + + + - 
 
6a ( , )   + + + + + + + + - 
* +: (strictly) positive. -: negative. 
  
15 
 
Table 10: Global Welfare of Stable Coalitions* 
 Parameter a m* 10   50   100   
   CGI(m*) % CGI(m*) % CGI(m*) % 
 
1a ( , )   10/9-10/9 100/98.7 100/99 100/98.7 
 
2a ( , )   10/6-10/6 100/93.5 100/93.4 100/93.5 
1   3a ( , )   10/6-10/6 100/44.1 100/43 100/44.1 
 
4a ( , )   10/5-10/5 100/<0 100/<0 100/<0 
 
5a ( , )   10/5-10/5 100/<0 100/<0 100/<0 
 
6a ( , )   10/5-10/5 100/<0 100/<0 100/<0 
 Parameter a  10   50   100   
  m* CGI(m*) % CGI(m*) % CGI(m*) % 
 
1a ( , )   10/9-10/9 100/97.3 100/97.5 100/97.6 
 
2a ( , )   10/8-10/8 100/95.5 100/95.3 100/95.2 
0.5   3a ( , )   10/6-10/6 100/78.7 100/74.2 100/74.1 
 
4a ( , )   10/6-10/6 100/<0 100/<0 100/<0 
 
5a ( , )   10/5-10/5 100/<0 100/<0 100/<0 
 
6a ( , )   10/5-10/5 100/<0 100/<0 100/<0 
 Parameter a  10   50   100   
  m* CGI(m*) % CGI(m*) % CGI(m*) % 
 
1a ( , )   6/6/6 87.9/87.9 87.3/87.3 87.2/87.2 
 
2a ( , )   8/8/8 97.7/97.7 97.4/97.4 97.4/97.4 
0   3a ( , )   8/8/8 98.0/98.0 97.9/97.7 97.7/97.7 
 
4a ( , )   9/9/9 99.8/99.8 99.7/99.7 99.7/99.7 
 
5a ( , )   9/9/9 99.9/99.9 99.8/99.8 99.8/99.8 
 
6a ( , )   9/9/9 99.9/99.9 99.9/99.9 99.9/99.9 
* m*: size of stable coalition(s) for a simultaneous and sequential coalition formation process under open membership/simultaneous coalition formation 
process under exclusive membership/sequential coalition formation process under exclusive membership. CGI: closing the gap index: 
*
i N i N i N i Ni i i iW (m ) W (m 1) / W (m n) W (m 1)           , first entry largest and second entry CGI for the smallest stable coalition m*.  
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Table 11: Welfare of Non-Signatories with BCAs minus No-BCAs* 
 Parameter a Coalition Size 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
1a ( , )    - - - - - - - - 
 
2a ( , )   - - - - - - - - 
1    3a ( , )   - - - - - - - - 
 
4a ( , )   - - - - - - - - 
 
5a ( , )   - - - - - - - - 
 
6a ( , )   - - - - - - - - 
 Parameter a Coalition Size 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + -
1 - - 
 
2a ( , )   + + + - - - - - 
0.5    3a ( , )   + -
1 - - - - - - 
 
4a ( , )   - - - - - - - - 
 
5a ( , )   - - - - - - - - 
 
6a ( , )   - - - - - - - - 
 Parameter a Coalition Size 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
1a ( , )    + + + + + - - - 
 
2a ( , )   + + + + + - - - 
0    3a ( , )   + + + + + - - - 
 
4a ( , )   + + + + + - - - 
 
5a ( , )   + + + + + - - - 
 
6a ( , )   + + + + + - - - 
* Difference: (strictly) positive (+) and negative (-); 1 holds for 50   and 100   but is positive for 10  . 
Tables 
Table 1: Stable Coalitions and Global Welfare under Open Membership 
 No-BCA-regime BCA-regime 
  *m  *CGI(m )  *m  *CGI(m )  
1 1 0 10 100 
0.5 2 1 10 100 
0 3 7.3 6-9 87.9-99.9 
 
 
Table 2: Stable Coalitions and Global Welfare under Exclusive Membership 
 Parameter a No-BCA-regime BCA-regime 
   *m  *CGI(m )  
% 
* * *
L Hm m m   
simultaneous 
* *
Lm m
sequential 
*
LCGI(m )  
*
HCGI(m )  
1 
1a ( , )   to 3a ( , )   1 0 9-10/6-10/6-10 9/6/6 98.7/93.5/44.1 100/100/100 
 
4a ( , )   to 6a ( , )   1 0 5-10/5-10/5-10 5/5/5 <0/<0/<0 100/100/100 
0.5 
1a ( , )   to 3a ( , )   2 1 9-10/8-10/6-10 9/8/6 97.3/95.5/78.9 100/100/100 
 
4a ( , )   to 6a ( , )   2 1 6-10/5-10/5-10 6/5/5 <0/<0/<0 100/100/100 
0 
1a ( , )   to 3a ( , )   3 7.3 6/8/8 6/8/8 87.9/97.7/98.0 87.9/97.7/98.0 
 
4a ( , )   to 6a ( , )   3 7.3 9/9/9 9/9/9 99.8/99.9/99.9 99.8/99.9/99.9 
No-BCA-regime: *m : size of stable coalition for a simultaneous and sequential coalition formation process; BCA-regime: entries for different values of  
ka ( , )  , k 1, 2, ...,6  as outlined in Section 4; 
*m  simultaneous (sequential): size of stable coalition(s) for a simultaneous (sequential) coalition formation 
process; 
*
LCGI(m )  (
*
HCGI(m ) ) CGI for the smallest (largest) stable coalition 
*
Lm  (
*
Hm ) in the simultaneous coalition formation process, with 
* * *
L Hm m m   
(
* *
Lm m ) for a simultaneous (sequential) formation process. CGI for the BCA-regime assumes the particular value 10   with similar results for 50   and 
100   (see Table 10 in Appendix 2).  
Figure 1a: Stability Function and BCAs 
 
Figure 1b: Welfare of Signatories and BCAs 
 
Figure 1c: Global Welfare and BCAs 
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